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Abstract
In a two-sector general equilibrium model with pollution (arising from production)
affecting the productivity, I examine in both autarky and trade equilibria the equiva-
lence between tax and quota, that is, whether they can replace each other to achieve
the same environmental goals. I show that (i) sometimes tax cannot achieve what
quota can; (ii) the equivalence/non-equivalence between tax and quota may change
due to trade liberalization; (iii) the choice of numeraire matters under tax regulation.
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JEL classification: F18; H23; Q58
1 Introduction
Tax and quota are among the most popular instruments to achieve environmental goals.
Under tax regulation, the government determines the price of pollution discharge and lets
the market determine the amount of pollution. In contrast, under quota regulation, the
government determines the amount and lets the market determines the price of pollution
discharge. The comparison between tax and quota often focuses on practical issues such as
the ease of implementation, both technological and political. Many theoretical studies on
this topic, pioneered by Weitzman (1974), focus on uncertainty or lake of information.1
∗Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan. E-mail:
ligang.hitu@gmail.com
1See also Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), Newell and Pizer (2003), Karp and Zhang (2005), and recently
Grodecka and Kuralbayeva (2015).
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In this paper, I try to compare tax and quota from another aspect. Assuming away
implementation cost and uncertainty, I ask whether tax and quota can still substitute each
other without any problem. Or more specifically, can an explicit pollution tax reproduce a
pollution level that, if set alternatively as an emission quota, produces an implicit pollution
tax equal to the explicit pollution tax and vice versa?
The comparison is conducted using a two-sector model with negative impacts of pollution
on the production side. The labor is the only primary input and the pollution, which arises as
joint products, is treated as an input by assuming underlying abatement activities. I examine
the effects of quota and tax in autarky and in free trade. The main results are: (i) tax is
less effective than quota in the sense that sometimes tax cannot achieve environmental goals
that quota can; (ii) trade liberalization may change the equivalence/nonequivalence between
tax and quota.
I also show that the choice of numeraire may hugely affect the effects of tax. In economic
models, the numeraire is usually chosen arbitrarily or just for convenience. In this model,
however, the choice of numeraire matters. This is because when adjusting the pollution tax,
we actually change the relative price of pollution with respect to the numeraire good/factor.
Therefore, given different numeraire, a change in tax may affect the economy through differ-
ent channels. For example, let the wage be the numeraire, then the pollution tax takes effect
mainly through the substitution between labor input and pollution discharge. However, if
we choose a consumption good as the numeraire, the pollution tax works not only through
the substitution channel but also through the negative impacts of pollution on production.
In particular, in this model, choosing the wage as the numeraire makes the pollution tax
more likely to be effective, compared to choosing consumption goods.
In a closely related work, Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) compare different emission regula-
tions in an open economy and derive the similar result that tax and quota may not be able to
substitute each other. But the mechanisms driving the result are quit different: they assume
the negative effects of emission on utility, whereas I assume the negative effects on produc-
tion. The negative impacts of pollution on production are practically significant, especially
in industries like forestry, agriculture, fishing, tourism, and alternative energy. For example,
Reddy and Behera (2006) estimates a loss of $213.2 per household per annum on agriculture
due to pollution in Kazipalle village, India. This paper also differs from Ishikawa and Kiy-
ono (2006) in the type of pollution. They focus on the greenhouse gases (GHGs), which are
transboundary emissions. In this paper, I focus on the non-transboundary pollution, which
is also important in reality. As Sweeney (1993, pp.761) suggests, among a large number of
types of pollution, many have relatively small damage range such as noise, radiation, NOx,
SOx and particulates.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model. Section 3
considers the effects of quota and tax in autarky. Section 4 moves on to the analysis of a
small open economy.
2 The Model
There are two consumption goods, manufacturing and agriculture goods, denoted by M
and A. There is one primary input, labor, with the endowment L. Accompanying the
production of consumption goods arises pollution as the joint product. Each firm can involve
in abatement activities by allocating some labor to reduce the discharge pollution.
Firms Assume that, if firms conduct no abatement, the output of good j (j = M,A) is
linearly proportionate to the labor input: Xj = Lj/G
j (Z), where Lj is the labor input, Z is
the total pollution discharge. The function Gj (Z) measures the negative effects of pollution
on the firms that produce good j, which satisfies Gj′ (Z) > 0 and Gj (0) > 0.2 Without any
abatement, the pollution discharge arising from the production of good j, Zj, is assumed
proportionate to the scale of the production activity measured by the labor input: Zj = γLj.
Clearly, Z = ZM + ZA.
If firms conduct some abatement, given the same amount of labor in these firms, the
pollution discharge declines: Zj < γLj. Abatement actually introduces a substitution be-
tween labor input and pollution discharge, it is therefore convenient to treat pollution as an
“input”. Following Copeland and Taylor (1994), write the output as a linearly homogeneous
function of Zj and Lj: Xj = F
j (Lj, Zj) /G
j (Z), where F j (Lj, Zj) is strictly increasing and
strictly quasi-concave with respect to Lj and Zj. For simplicity, further assume that both
F i (Lj, Zj) and G
i (Z) are twice continuously differentiable.
Indeed, we can combine no abatement and abatement cases into one production function
as follows.
Xj =
F j (Lj, Zj)
Gj (Z)
, Zj ∈ (0, γLj] , (1)
where F j (Lj, γLj) ≡ Lj.
Firms under perfect competition maximize the profit by taking the total pollution dis-
charge (Z) as given. The linear homogeneity of F j (Lj, Zj) implies that firms’ decision can
2Mayeres and Proost (2001) term this type of negative effect “feedback effect”. Given certain function
forms, an externality on production and that on utility can be equivalent, since an externality on production
eventually enters utility function through consumption.
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be described by the cost minimization problem:
min
ai,ej
waj + rej, s.t.F
j (aj, ej) = 1, (2)
where w and r is the wage rate and the price of pollution discharge. Recall that Zj ∈ (0, γLj],
which implies ej/aj ∈ (0, γ]. Clearly, (2) has interior solutions only if r/w is not too low;
otherwise, firms may have no incentive to conduct abatement and the corner solution arises.
Precisely, we have
a∗j =

1
r
w
∈ (0, η] ,
aj (r, w)
r
w
∈ (η,∞) ,
e∗j =

γ
r
w
∈ (0, η] ,
ej (r, w)
r
w
∈ (η,∞) ,
where
η ≡
∂F j (1, γ) /∂ej
∂F j (1, γ) /∂aj
.
Let cj (r, w) ≡ waj (r, w) + rej (r, w), which is linearly homogenous, then the unit cost of
good j is Gj (Z) cj (r, w). Perfect competition together with profit maximization gives the
following Kuhn-Tucker condition:
Gj (Z) cj (r, w) ≥ pj, Xj ≥ 0,
(
Gj (Z) cj (r, w)− pj
)
Xj = 0. (3)
As long as good j is produced, we have Gj (Z) cj (r, w) = pj. For convenience, define the
sensitivity as
εj ≡ −
∂ lnXj
∂ lnZ
=
d lnGj (Z)
d lnZ
> 0, (4)
which captures how fast the output of good j declines with the total pollution discharge.
Households Assume the representative household has the utility function of Cobb-Douglas
type:
u = CbAC
1−b
M , (5)
where Cj is the consumption on good j and b is the spending share on agriculture good.
The government transfers the tax revenue to households in a lump-sum fashion, so the
income Y = wL+ rZ. The household maximizes the utility subject to the budget constraint
Y = pACA + pMCM , yielding the domestic demands: CA = bY/pA and CM = (1− b)Y/pM .
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Quota and tax In this paper, I focus on two instruments of environmental regulation:
emission quota and pollution tax. Under quota regulation, the government issues emission
permits to control directly the amount of total pollution discharge: Z = Q. The permits
can be traded freely, so the same price of permits prevails in the economy. Obviously, with
a quota Q < γL, the model becomes a two-factor two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model with
labor endowment L and “environment endowment” Q, with a difference that the level of Q
affects the productivity as well.
On the other hand, under tax regulation, the government imposes tax on pollution dis-
charge to control directly the price of pollution discharge. Note that the pollution tax should
be imposed in a relative sense, say, the government determines the level of r/w or r/pj rather
than just the level of r. This is because we have not specified the numeraire. If the gov-
ernment changes just r, all other prices can change by the same ratio and the real economy
(outputs, pollution discharge, and utility level) will remain unchanged. Note that the effects
of changing r/w or r/pj is the same as the effects of changing r in a model with the numeraire
w = 1 or pj = 1. To show that in terms of what the pollution tax is imposed, or equivalently
the choice of numeraire, may affect the effects of pollution tax, it is convenient to let the
numeraire not specified throughout the model.
3 Autarky
Consider the effects of quota and tax in autarky. For the purpose, first characterize the equi-
librium in autarky. The clearing in good markets requires bY/pA = XA and (1− b)Y/pM =
XM . Given the Cobb-Douglas utility function, both goods are essential and thus produced
in autarky equilibrium, which gives, by (3), Gj (Z) cj (r, w) = pj. The goods market clearing
condition can be rewritten into
XAG
A (Z) cA (r, w) = bY, (6)
XMG
M (Z) cM (r, w) = (1− b)Y. (7)
On the other hand, the production of good j demands labor XjG
j (Z) aj (r, w), so the labor
clearing requires ∑
j
XjG
j (Z) aj (r, w) = L. (8)
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At the same time, the production of good j yields pollution XjG
i (Z) ej (r, w), so the total
pollution is ∑
j
XjG
i (Z) ej (r, w) = Z. (9)
There are six variables (XA, XM , Y , r, w, and Z) to solve from the four equations above.
Since we have not specified the numeraire, only the relative prices r/w and Y/w matter.3
Under quota regulation, Z is exogenous and we can solve the four equations for XA, XM ,
Y/w, and r/w. Under tax regulation, if the government determines r/w, we can solve for XA,
XM , Y/w, and Z. If the government determines the pollution tax in terms of other prices,
say r/pA or r/pM , we have slightly different equations for equilibrium. However, it turns out
that the effects of a change in r/pj can be readily obtained once we have derived the effects
of a change in r/w. Therefore, for the purpose of comparative statics, it is sufficient to focus
on (6) to (9).
Taking the logarithmic differential of (6) to (9) and using dL = 0, ∂cj (r, w) /∂r = e∗j ,
and ∂cj (r, w) /∂w = a∗j , we can obtain
XˆA + εAZˆ + θZA (rˆ − wˆ) = Yˆ − wˆ, (10)
XˆM + εM Zˆ + θZM (rˆ − wˆ) = Yˆ − wˆ, (11)∑
j
λLj
[
Xˆj + εjZˆ + aˆ
∗
j
]
= 0, (12)
∑
j
λZj
[
Xˆj + εjZˆ + eˆ
∗
j
]
= Zˆ, (13)
where θij denotes the income share of factor i in good j (e.g., θZM ≡ rZM/ (pMXM)), whereas
λij denotes the allocation share of factor i in good j (e.g., λZM ≡ ZM/Z). As usually, the
hat over a variable denotes the proportionate change, e.g., Zˆ ≡ dZ/Z.
To further simplify (12) and (13), note that the cost minimization implies θLj aˆ
∗
j+θZj eˆ
∗
j =
0, so we have
aˆ∗j = θZjσj (rˆ − wˆ) , eˆ
∗
j = −θLjσj (rˆ − wˆ) , (14)
where σj ≡ −d ln
(
e∗j/a
∗
j
)
/d ln (r/w) = −
(
eˆ∗j − aˆ
∗
j
)
/ (rˆ − wˆ) > 0 measures the elasticity of
substitution between labor input and pollution discharge in producing good j. By (14), we
can obtain ∑
j
λLj aˆ
∗
j = δL (rˆ − wˆ) ,
∑
j
λZj eˆ
∗
j = −δZ (rˆ − wˆ) , (15)
where δL ≡ λLMθZMσM + λLAθZAσA and δZ ≡ λZMθLMσM + λZAθLAσA have their economic
3The four equations (6) to (9) have implied that the income satisfies Y = wL+ rZ, i.e., the Warlas’s law.
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meanings: δL (δZ) measures the aggregate proportionate saving in labor input (pollution dis-
charge) given a proportionate rise in r/w while keeping all outputs unchanged.4 Substituting
(15) into (12) and (13), we can rewrite (10) to (13) as
XˆA −
(
Yˆ − wˆ
)
+ θZA (rˆ − wˆ) + εAZˆ = 0, (16)
XˆM −
(
Yˆ − wˆ
)
+ θZM (rˆ − wˆ) + εM Zˆ = 0, (17)∑
j
λLjXˆj + δL (rˆ − wˆ) +
∑
j
λLjεjZˆ = 0, (18)
∑
j
λZjXˆj − δZ (rˆ − wˆ) +
(∑
j
λZjεj − 1
)
Zˆ = 0. (19)
The effects of quota in autarky Under quota regulation, the government determines
emission quota to control the total amount of pollution discharge. Let Q denote the quota,
then Z = Q is exogenously given. Noting that Zˆ = Qˆ, rewrite (16) to (19) into

1 0 −1 θZA
0 1 −1 θZM
λLA λLM 0 δL
λZA λZM 0 −δZ




XˆA
XˆM
Yˆ − wˆ
rˆ − wˆ

 =


−εA
−εM
−
∑
j λLjεj
1−
∑
j λZjεj

 Qˆ. (20)
Solving (20) for XˆA, XˆM , and rˆ − wˆ yields
5
d lnXA
d lnQ
= −εA + a12 − θZAa22, (21)
d lnXM
d lnQ
= −εM + a12 − θZMa22, (22)
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
= a22, (23)
where
a12 =
λLMθZM (σM − 1) + λLAθZA (σA − 1)
(λZMθLM + λLMθZM) (σM − 1) + (λZAθLA + λLAθZA) (σA − 1) + 1
, (24)
a22 =
−1
(λZMθLM + λLMθZM) (σM − 1) + (λZAθLA + λLAθZA) (σA − 1) + 1
. (25)
4See Chang (1981) and Jones (1965) for more details.
5We do not give Yˆ − wˆ since it is not our interest. It is easy to obtain that Yˆ − wˆ = a12Qˆ.
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We can decompose (21) and (22) and see the effects of quota on the outputs more intuitively:
d lnXj
d lnQ
=
d lnGj (Q)
d lnQ
+ θLj
d lnLj
d lnQ
+ θZj
d lnZj
d lnQ
= −εj︸︷︷︸
TFP
+θLj [a12 + (σj − 1) θZja22]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor reallocation
+θZj [a12 − (θLjσj + θZj) a22]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Permits reallocation
.
An increase in the emission quota has three effects on the outputs. First, it reduces the
productivity, which is negative. Second, it induces reallocation of labor, which is necessarily
positive for one good and negative for the other. Third, an increase in the emission quota
induces an augment in the amount of emission permits as well as the reallocation of permits
among two goods, which can be positive in both goods or positive for one good and negative
for the other. The aggregate effects are then ambiguous. This is also true for the the price
of permits in terms of the wage, i.e., r/w.
To see the effects on r/pj, use pj = G
j (Z) cj (r, w) = Gj (Q) cj (r, w) to obtain
d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ
=
d ln
(
r
Gj(Q)cj(r,w)
)
d lnQ
=
rˆ − cˆj (r, w)
ˆ¯Z
+ εj. (26)
On the other hand, recall that cˆj (r, w) = θZj rˆ+ θLjwˆ = rˆ− θLj (rˆ − wˆ), which together with
(26) yields
d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ
= θLj
rˆ − wˆ
Qˆ
+ εj. (27)
Using (23), a change in emission quota affects r/pj as follows.
d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ
= θLja22 + εj, (28)
Clearly, the effects of quota on r/pj are also ambiguous. It follows that
Proposition 1. In autarky, the emission quota may have regular effects (i.e., an increase
in quota decreases the price of permits) or irregular effects (an increase in quota increases
the price of permits), depending on in terms of what the permits is measured and the signs
of (25) and (28). Moreover, the quota is more likely to have regular effects on r/w compared
to r/pj.
Consider the special case in which FA and FM are of Cobb-Douglas forms and thus
σA = σM = 1. It follows directly from (25) and (28) that
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Corollary 2. In autarky, given Cobb-Douglas form of FA and FM , the emission quota has
regular effects on r/w, but may have irregular effects on r/pj (which arises if εj > θLj).
These results highlight that, given a change in quota, the price of permits may change in
different directions when measured in different references. This has an important implication
for tax regulation that, as shown in coming analysis, the effects of tax may vary dramatically
with the choice of numeraire.
The necessary condition for the optimal quota can be readily obtained using the results
above. Note that uˆ = bCˆA+(1− b) CˆM = bXˆA+(1− b) XˆM in autarky, which together with
(21) and (22) gives
d ln u
d lnQ
= − [bεA + (1− b) εM ] + a12 − [bθZA + (1− b) θZM ] a22. (29)
Therefore, the optimal quota, denoted Q∗, satisfies Q∗ ∈ (0, γL) and d ln u/d lnQ = 0 in
(29) (the interior solution), or Q∗ = γL and d ln u/d lnQ ≥ 0 in (29) (the corner solution).
The effects of tax in autarky Under tax regulation, the government determines the
pollution tax in terms of certain other price. If the government imposes the pollution tax in
terms of the wage, then r/w is exogenously given. Let τw denote the tax imposed in terms
of the wage, then r/w = τw and rˆ − wˆ = τˆw. Rewrite (16) to (19) into

1 0 −1 −εA
0 1 −1 −εM
λLA λLM 0 −
∑
j λLjεj
λZA λZM 0 1−
∑
j λZjεj




XˆA
XˆM
Yˆ − wˆ
Zˆ

 =


θZA
θZM
δL
−δZ

 τˆw. (30)
The results under quota regulation turn out to be very useful in deriving the effects of tax
regulation.
Lemma 3. In autarky, if the pollution tax is imposed in terms of the wage, i.e., the govern-
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ment determines r/w = τw, a change in the pollution tax has effects:
d lnXA
d ln τw
=
d lnXA
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
=
−εA + a12
a22
− θZA, (31)
d lnXM
d ln τw
=
d lnXM
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
=
−εM + a12
a22
− θZM , (32)
d lnZ
d ln τw
=
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
=
1
a22
. (33)
Since the sign of a22 is ambiguous, an increase in the pollution tax imposed in terms of
the wage does not necessarily reduce the total amount of pollution discharge.
If the government imposes the pollution tax in terms of good j, then r/pj is exogenously
determined. Let τpj denote the tax imposed in terms of good j, then r/pj = τpj and
rˆ − pˆj = τˆpj . The following lemma follows directly from (21), (22), (23) and (28).
Lemma 4. In autarky, if the pollution tax is imposed in terms of good j, i.e., the government
determines r/pj, a change in the pollution tax has effects:
d lnXA
d ln τpj
=
d lnXA
d lnQ

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
−εA + a12 − θZAa22
θLja22 + εj
, (34)
d lnXM
d ln τpj
=
d lnXM
d lnQ

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
−εM + a12 − θZMa22
θLja22 + εj
, (35)
d lnZ
d ln τpj
=

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
1
θLja22 + εj
. (36)
Since the sign of θLja22 + εj is ambiguous, an increase in the pollution tax imposed in
terms of good j does not necessarily reduce the total pollution discharge. By (33) and (36),
the proof of Proposition 1 also applies here and we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5. In autarky, the pollution tax may have regular effects (i.e., an increase in
tax reduces the total pollution) or irregular effects (i.e., an increase in tax increases the total
pollution), depending on in terms of what the tax is imposed and the signs of (25) and (28).
The pollution tax in terms of the wage is more likely to have regular effects, compared to the
pollution tax in terms of consumption goods. In other words, the pollution tax is more likely
to have regular effects when choosing the wage rate as the numeraire.
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Intuitively, when imposed in terms of the wage, a change in pollution tax means a change
in r/w, which takes effect through the substitution between labor input and pollution dis-
charge. In contrast, when imposed in terms of good j, a change in pollution tax means a
change in r/pj, which takes effect through not only the substitution channel but also the
negative impact of pollution on productivities.
Similarly, if FA and FM are of Cobb-Douglas type, it follows directly from (33) and (36)
that
Corollary 6. In autarky, given Cobb-Douglas form of FA and FM , the pollution tax has reg-
ular effects when imposed in terms of the wage, but may have irregular effects when imposed
in terms of good j (which arises if εj > θLj).
Stability under tax regulation Suppose that the economy was originally in equilibrium.
Now consider a slight increase in pollution discharge due to some unexpected shocks. If
the pollution tax has irregular effects, the increase in total pollution will raise the market
evaluation (imputed price) of emission permits. At the same time, the explicit price of
permits, i.e., the pollution tax, remains unchanged under tax regulation. So firms have
the incentive to “use” more pollution (or, reduce the effort in abatement), which causes
further increases in the total pollution discharge. This suggests that, if the pollution tax
has irregular effects, an equilibrium under tax regulation would be unstable. Rigorously,
suppose a Marshallian adjustment process in the pollution discharge:
Z˙ = βτ
( r
w
− τw
)
, (37)
where βτ > 0 is the adjustment speed; τw is pollution tax in terms of the wage, determined
by the government; r/w is the market evaluation (imputed price) of emission permits in
terms of the wage, calculated by taking the total pollution discharge Z at the moment as
given. If the pollution tax has irregular effects, by (33), d (r/w) /dZ > 0, which simply says
that (37) is unstable.
If the government imposes the tax in terms of good j, we can assume the adjustment
process
Z˙ = βτ
(
r
pj
− τpj
)
,
and the similar argument applies. The discussion above can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 7. Assume the Marshallian adjustment in pollution discharge, under tax regulation,
an equilibrium is unstable if the pollution tax has irregular effects.
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4 Free Trade
In this section, I examine the effects of quota and tax regulations in free trade by focusing
on a small open economy (SOE). I first consider the case in which the SOE remains diver-
sified, and then, since the SOE may specialize, move on to the characterization of complete
specialization.
4.1 Diversified Equilibrium
If the SOE remains diversified in equilibrium, both sectors are active and the minimized
costs satisfy
GM (Z) cM (r, w)
GA (Z) cA (r, w)
=
pM
pA
, (38)
where pM/pA is given in SOE. The labor market clearing condition (8) and the total pollution
discharge (9) still hold. Taking the logarithmic differential of (38) and using d (pM/pA) = 0,
we have
(εM − εA) Zˆ + (θZM − θZA) (rˆ − wˆ) = 0, (39)
which together with (18) and (19) gives the system of comparative statics.
The effects of quota in SOE (Diversified equilibrium) Under quota regulation, Z =
Q is exogenously given. Rewrite (18), (19), and (39) into

 0 0 θZM − θZAλLA λLM δL
λZA λZM −δZ



 XˆAXˆM
rˆ − wˆ

 =

 εA − εM−∑j λLjεj
1−
∑
j λZjεj

 Qˆ (40)
Some algebra yields
d lnXA
d lnQ
= −εA −
λLM
|λ|
+
(εM − εA) (λZMδL + λLMδZ)
|λ| |θ|
, (41)
d lnXM
d lnQ
= −εM +
λLA
|λ|
−
(εM − εA) (λZAδL + λLAδZ)
|λ| |θ|
, (42)
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
= −
εM − εA
|θ|
, (43)
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where |λ| = λZM − λLM = λLA − λZA, |θ| = θZM − θZA = θLA − θLM . As for the effects on
r/pj, note that (27) remains true. Substituting (43) into (27) gives
d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ
= −
θLj (εM − εA)
|θ|
+ εj, (44)
Focusing on the effects of quota changes on the price of permits, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 8. In a diversified SOE, the emission quota may have regular or irregular
effects, depending on in terms of what the permits are measured and the signs of (43) and
(44). If the pollution-intensive good is more (less) sensitive to pollution, the emission quota
has regular (irregular) effects on r/w. Again, the emission quota is more likely to have
regular effects on r/w, compared to r/pj.
The effects of tax in SOE (Diversified equilibrium) Under tax regulation, the pol-
lution tax (in terms of certain price) is determined by the government. If the pollution tax
is imposed in terms of the wage, r/w = τw is exogenously given. Similar with Lemma 3, the
results under quota regulation can be used and we can obtain
d lnXA
d ln τw
=
d lnXA
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
=
εA |λ| |θ|+ λLM |θ| − (εM − εA) (λZMδL + λLMδZ)
|λ| (εM − εA)
,
(45)
d lnXM
d ln τw
=
d lnXM
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
=
εM |λ| |θ| − λLA |θ|+ (εM − εA) (λZAδL + λLAδZ)
|λ| (εM − εA)
,
(46)
d lnZ
d ln τw
=
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
= −
|θ|
εM − εA
. (47)
13
If the pollution tax is imposed in terms of good j, r/pj = τpj is given. Similar with Lemma
4, we have
d lnXA
d ln τpj
=
d lnXA
d lnQ

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
εA |λ| |θ|+ λLM |θ| − (εM − εA) (λZMδL + λLMδZ)
|λ| (θLjεM − θLjεA − |θ| εj)
,
(48)
d lnXM
d ln τpj
=
d lnXM
d lnQ

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
εM |λ| |θ| − λLA |θ|+ (εM − εA) (λZAδL + λLAδZ)
|λ| (θLjεM − θLjεA − |θ| εj)
,
(49)
d lnZ
d ln τpj
=

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
= −
|θ|
θLjεM − θLjεA − |θ| εj
. (50)
The follow proposition summarizes these results by focusing on the effects of tax on total
pollution discharge.
Proposition 9. In a diversified SOE, the pollution tax may have regular or irregular effects,
depending on in terms of what the tax is imposed and the signs of (43) and (44). If the
pollution-intensive good is more (less) sensitive to pollution, the pollution tax in terms of the
wage has regular (irregular) effects. Moreover, the pollution tax in terms of the wage is more
likely to have regular effects, compared to the pollution tax in terms of consumption goods.
By Lemma 7, the equilibrium is unstable if the pollution tax has irregular effects, implying
that tax cannot achieve some environmental goals that quota can. In this sense, tax is not
equivalent to quota. It follows directly from Proposition 9 that
Corollary 10. If the pollution-intensive good is less sensitive to the pollution in an SOE,
the diversified equilibrium under tax regulation is unstable.
4.2 Specialized Equilibrium
So far we consider the case of diversified equilibrium in an SOE. However, it is possible for the
economy to specialize completely in free trade. If the economy specializes in manufacturing,
we have
XMG
M (Z) aM (r, w) = L, (51)
XMG
M (Z) eM (r, w) = Z. (52)
14
Take the logarithmic differential and obtain
XˆM + θZMσM (rˆ − wˆ) + εM Zˆ = 0, (53)
XˆM − θLMσM (rˆ − wˆ) + (εM − 1) Zˆ = 0. (54)
In contrast, if the economy specializes in agriculture, we have
XAG
A (Z) aA (r, w) = L, (55)
XAG
A (Z) eA (r, w) = Z. (56)
Take the logarithmic differential and obtain
XˆA + θZAσA (rˆ − wˆ) + εAZˆ = 0, (57)
XˆA − θLAσA (rˆ − wˆ) + (εA − 1) Zˆ = 0. (58)
The effects of quota in SOE (Specialized equilibrium) Under quota regulation,
Z = Q is given. The effects of quota depend on in which sector the economy specializes. If
the economy specializes in manufacturing, (53) and (54) imply that
d lnXM
d lnQ
= (θZM − εM) , (59)
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
= −
1
σM
. (60)
As for the effects on r/pj, it follows from (27) that
d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ
= −
θLj
σM
+ εj. (61)
If the economy specializes in agriculture, (57) and (58) imply that
d lnXA
d lnQ
= (θZA − εA) , (62)
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
= −
1
σA
. (63)
Again, it follows from (27) that
d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ
= −
θLj
σA
+ εj. (64)
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Focusing on the effect on the price of permits, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 11. If the SOE specializes completely, the quota has regular effects on r/w,
but may have irregular effects on r/pj (which arises if σMεj − θLj > 0 when specializing in
manufacturing or σAεj − θLj > 0 when specializing in agriculture).
The effects of tax in SOE (Specialized equilibrium) Under tax regulation, the pol-
lution tax is determined by the government. If the pollution tax is imposed in terms of the
wage, r/w = τw is exogenously given. If the economy specializes in manufacturing, from
(53) and (54) we have
d lnXM
d ln τw
=
d lnXM
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
= −σM (θZM − εM) , (65)
d lnZ
d ln τw
=
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
= −σM . (66)
If the pollution tax is imposed in terms of good j, r/pj = τpj is given. We have
d lnXM
d ln τpj
=
d lnXM
d lnQ

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
σM (θZM − εM)
−θLj + σMεj
(67)
d lnZ
d ln τpj
=

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
σM
−θLj + σMεj
. (68)
If the economy specializes in agriculture, we have
d lnXA
d ln τw
=
d lnXA
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
= −σA (θZA − εA) ,
d lnZ
d ln τw
=
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
= −σA.
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Similarly, if the pollution tax is imposed in terms of good j,
d lnXA
d ln τpj
=
d lnXA
d lnQ

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
σA (θZA − εA)
−θLj + σAεj
d lnZ
d ln τpj
=

d ln
(
r
pj
)
d lnQ


−1
=
σA
−θLj + σAεj
.
The effects of tax on the total pollution discharge can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 12. If the SOE specializes completely, the pollution tax in terms of wage has
regular effects, but the pollution tax in terms of good j may have irregular effects (which arises
if σMεj − θLj > 0 when specializing in manufacturing or σAεj − θLj > 0 when specializing in
agriculture). With irregular effects, the equilibrium is unstable.
4.3 The Whole Picture
The specialization pattern is not independent of the environmental regulations. An SOE
may go through both diversified and specialized equilibria as the stringency of environmental
regulation changes. To build up the whole picture for free trade, we need to know under
what condition the economy specializes. For the purpose, it is convenient to focus on quota
regulation first. Define
κj
( r
w
)
≡
ej (r, w)
aj (r, w)
=
ej
(
r
w
, 1
)
aj
(
r
w
, 1
) , κ ≡ Q
L
,
where Q is the quota determined by the government.
Suppose without loss of generality that the production of manufacturing good is pollution-
intensive, which implies that κM (r/w) > κA (r/w). The sufficient and necessary condition
for both goods to be produced is then κM (r/w) > κ > κA (r/w). Otherwise, if κ = κM (r/w),
the economy specializes in manufacturing (i.e. XA = 0); if κ = κA (r/w), the economy
specializes in labor-intensive agriculture (i.e. XM = 0).
Suppose that the SOE was originally diversified. Given the world relative price pM/pA
and the quota Q, we can derive r/w from (38). It follows from (43) that
d lnκj
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
=
d lnκj
(
r
w
)
d ln
(
r
w
) d ln ( rw)
d lnQ
=
σj (εM − εA)
|θ|
, (69)
where d lnκj
(
r
w
)
/d ln
(
r
w
)
= −σj is used. By (69), if manufacturing good is less sensitive
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(εM − εA < 0), κj (r/w) decreases with quota Q . On the other hand, κ = Q/L increases
with Q. Therefore, if we keep raising Q, eventually κM (r/w) = κ; and if we keep reducing
Q, eventually κA (r/w) = κ. That is, there exists Ql < Qh such that the economy (i) remains
diversified if Q ∈ (Ql, Qh); (ii) completely specializes in the labor-intensive good if Q ≤ Ql;
(iii) completely specializes in the pollution-intensive good if Q ≥ Qh.
6
In contrast, if manufacturing good is more sensitive (εM − εA > 0), both κj (r/w) and
κ increase with Q. In this case, specialization does not necessarily arise or there may be
multiple intervals of quota where the SOE remains diversified.
The similar argument applies to the case in which agriculture is pollution-intensive. To
summarize, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Under quota regulation, if the pollution-intensive good is less sensitive to the
pollution, as the quota increases, the SOE first specializes in the labor-intensive good, then
becomes diversified, and finally specializes in the pollution-intensive good.
By Corollary 10, if the pollution-intensive good is less sensitive to the pollution, a di-
versified equilibrium under tax regulation is unstable. By Lemma 13, this implies that tax
regulation cannot achieve the environmental goals between the range (Ql, Qh), which quota
regulation can. In this sense, tax is not equivalent to quota. In contrast, if the pollution-
intensive good is more sensitive, quota and tax (in terms of the wage) are negatively related,
and the equilibrium is stable. In this sense, the two regulations are equivalent.
Figure 1 draws the nonequivalence case in which manufacturing is pollution-intensive but
less sensitive to pollution. The figure shows how the specialization pattern and the price of
permits (in terms of the wage) change with the quota. As illustrated in the figure, a pollution
tax τw ∈ [(r/w)l , (r/w)h] corresponds with three levels of total pollution discharge: Z1, Z2,
and Z3. Among those, Z1 and Z3 correspond with specialization equilibria in agriculture
and manufacturing, respectively, whereas Z2 corresponds with a diversified equilibrium. Ac-
cording to Lemma 7 and Proposition 9, the diversified equilibrium is unstable. Therefore,
any small shock will lead to complete specialization equilibrium (τw, Z1) or (τw, Z3).
5 Conclusion
Previous literature told us that tax and quota may not be equivalent if there is uncertainty
or incomplete information. In this paper, I show that the nonequivalence between tax and
quota can arise in a deterministic model with externalities on the production side. The
6For simplicity, we have implicitly assumed thatQh < γL. That is, the quota takes effect when specializing
in agriculture or remaining diversified, and takes effect in part of range when specializing in manufacturing.
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Figure 1: Nonequivalence between quota and tax (θZM > θZA and εM < εA)
analysis of the model suggests that, without any cost of implementation, quota is superior
to tax since tax may not be able to achieve the environmental goals that quota can. This
holds in autarky and in free trade, although the conditions for such nonequivalence are
different.
In this paper, I consider a small open economy and a local type of pollution. We can
extend the model to a large country or a two-country model. We can also consider a trans-
boundary pollution. Both extensions are especially interesting if one wants to examine global
environmental issues such as greenhouse gases.
A Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By (28), the sign of d (r/w) /dQ depends on the sign of a22, which can be positive or neg-
ative. Similarly, the sign of d (r/pj) /dQ depends on that of (25), which is also ambiguous.
Note that d (r/w) /dQ > 0, i.e., a22 > 0, which implies d (r/pj) /dQ > 0. On the other
hand, d (r/pj) /dQ > 0 does not necessarily mean d (r/w) /dQ > 0. The space satisfying
d (r/w) /dQ > 0 is smaller than that satisfying d (r/pj) /dQ > 0. In such sense, we say that
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the latter is more likely to arise.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
It follows from (30) that, using the Cramer’s rule,
d lnZ
d ln τw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 −1 −θZA
0 1 −1 −θZM
λLA λLM 0 −δL
λZA λZM 0 δZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 −1 εA
0 1 −1 εM
λLA λLM 0
∑
j λLjεj
λZA λZM 0
∑
j λZjεj − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
,
which gives (33). Moreover,
d lnXA
d ln τw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−θZA 0 −1 εA
−θZM 1 −1 εM
−δL λLM 0
∑
j λLjεj
δZ λZM 0
∑
j λZjεj − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 −1 εA
0 1 −1 εM
λLA λLM 0
∑
j λLjεj
λZA λZM 0
∑
j λZjεj − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−εA 0 −1 θZA
−εM 1 −1 θZM
−
∑
j λLjεj λLM 0 δL
1−
∑
j λZjεj λZM 0 −δZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 −1 θZA
0 1 −1 θZM
λLA λLM 0 δL
λZA λZM 0 −δZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 −1 θZA
0 1 −1 θZM
λLA λLM 0 δL
λZA λZM 0 −δZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 0 −1 εA
0 1 −1 εM
λLA λLM 0
∑
j λLjεj
λZA λZM 0
∑
j λZjεj − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
d lnXA
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
,
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which gives (31). Similarly, we can obtain
d lnXM
d ln τw
=
d lnXM
d lnQ
(
d ln
(
r
w
)
d lnQ
)
−1
,
which gives (32).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 8
By (43), the sign of d (r/w) /dQ is ambiguous. This is also true for d (r/pj) /dQ, the sign of
which depends on that of (44). Suppose that good j is pollution-intensive compared to good
j′, i.e., θZj−θZj′ > 0. By (43), d (r/w) /dQ < 0 (d (r/w) /dQ > 0) if εj−εj′ > 0 (εj−εj′ < 0),
i.e., good j is more (less) sensitive than good j′. Again, by (43), d (r/pj) /dQ < 0 implies
d (r/w) /dQ < 0, but the opposite does not necessarily hold.
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